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De Novo Banks: Regulatory Flexibility and Merger
Activity May Not Be Enough to Spawn New Charters
I. INTRODUCTION
Increased de novo banking activity provides valuable services to
communities nationwide. 1 De novo banks offer credit services to the
agricultural industry, residential mortgage borrowers, and communities
that may otherwise find little assistance from alternative financial
institutions. 2 Additionally, by injecting energy into community banking
sectors lacking competition, de novo banks fill important voids within
local banking markets. 3 This contribution is vital in light of a Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) report claiming that community
banks provide 42% of small business loans nationwide. 4 As such, it is no
surprise that FDIC Chairman Jelena McWilliams suggests that a
prosperous de novo landscape is “critical to the long-term health of the
[banking] industry and communities across the country.” 5
Along with many other United States financial institutions, de
novo banks faced significant hardship following the 2008 Financial
Crisis. 6 Despite efforts by federal regulatory agencies to jumpstart de
novo banking activity, the power of these agencies to affect change is

1. Trey Sullivan, 2017 Likely to Be a Record-Breaking Year, TRUPOINT (Feb. 15, 2017),
https://www.trupointpartners.com/blog/de-novo-banks-2017
[https://perma.cc/BWS98VWG] (describing the various benefits de novo banks bring to their respective communities).
2. Kylee Wooten, The Role of De Novo Banks in Community Banking, ABRIGO (Aug.
14,
2018),
https://www.abrigo.com/blog/2018/08/14/the-role-of-de-novo-banks-incommunity-banking/ [https://perma.cc/8QTA-BM85]; FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., DE NOVO
BANKS:
ECONOMIC
TRENDS
AND
SUPERVISORY
FRAMEWORK
3
(2016),
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/supervisory/insights/sisum16/si_summer16article01.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LJ2-ERNC].
3. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 2, at 3.
4. Press Release, Fed. Deposit. Ins. Corp., FDIC Releases Report on Small Business
Lending Survey (Oct. 1, 2018) (on file with author).
5. Press Release, Fed. Deposit. Ins. Corp., FDIC Announces Actions (Dec. 6, 2018) (on
file with author).
6. See Robert M. Adams & Jacob P. Gramlich, Where Are All the New Banks? The Role
of Regulatory Burden in New Charter Creation 2 (Fed. Reserve Bd. Divs. of Research &
Statistics
and
Monetary
Affairs,
Working
Paper
No.
113,
2014),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2014/files/2014113pap.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WE6Y-SUD6] (explaining only seven new bank charters emerged from
2009 to 2013).
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limited. 7 Moreover, research suggests that the FDIC’s implementation
of stricter bank regulations post-Financial Crisis played only a minimal
role in decreased de novo bank entry. 8
At first glance, those desirous of a return to the pre-2008 de novo
banking landscape may find hope in recent legislative efforts, including
the Economic Growth Act and corporate tax rate cuts. 9 Although such
legislative reforms may alleviate difficulties facing de novo bank
formation, these efforts alone are likely insufficient to reestablish pre2008 de novo banking numbers. 10 However, de novo hopefuls should
pay attention to movement within North Carolina’s banking industry,
where the high volume of bank consolidation, including the largest bank
merger in over a decade, 11 could provide assistance to a barren de novo
landscape. 12
This Note proceeds in seven parts. Part II provides a brief
overview of recent de novo activity and two theories for the recent decline
in new bank entry. 13 Part III discusses the FDIC’s recent efforts to
encourage new bank entry. 14 Part IV assesses limitations on the FDIC’s
7. See
FED.
DEPOSIT
INS.
CORP.,
WHO
IS
THE
FDIC?,
https://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/symbol/index.html [https://perma.cc/G8WV-F528] (last
updated May 3, 2017) (stating the FDIC’s primary role includes insuring bank deposits,
overseeing bank compliance with various laws, and responding to certain bank failures).
8. See Adams & Gramlich, supra note 6, at 27 (explaining that various non-regulatory
factors likely led to at least 75% to 80% of the de novo bank decline following the Financial
Crisis).
9. See Hilary Burns, The De Novo Boom Is Just Getting Started, AM. BANKER (May 7,
2018, 12:14 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/the-de-novo-boom-is-just-gettingstarted [https://perma.cc/3Y2M-KKFT] [hereinafter De Novo Boom] (describing the potential
benefits of recent corporate tax rate cuts for de novo bank formation); see also Joseph C.
Fields, Note, The Potential Effect of the Economic Growth Act of 2018 on Bank Mergers and
Acquisitions: What This Means for De Novo Banks and CRA Lending, 23 N.C. BANKING INST.
359, 373 (2019) (explaining why the EGA’s provisions may provide incentive for increased
de novo formation).
10. See Paul Davis, Bank M&A in 2019: Pace up, Premiums down, AM. BANKER (Nov.
11, 2019, 9:00 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/list/bank-m-a-in-2019-pace-uppremiums-down [https://perma.cc/F7PK-E9NQ] (describing the EGA’s current shortfalls in
prompting M&A activity in 2019).
11. Hilary Burns, Will BB&T-SunTrust Start a De Novo Wave?, AM. BANKER (Mar. 12,
2019, 2:21 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/will-bb-t-suntrust-merger-start-ade-novo-wave [https://perma.cc/LX9G-M7CW] [hereinafter De Novo Wave] (describing the
potential benefits of the BB&T-SunTrust merger for North Carolina’s de novo banking
landscape).
12. Id.; De Novo Boom, supra note 9; Hilary Burns, Why North Carolina is De Novo
Central, AM. BANKER (Mar. 6, 2018, 2:11 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/whynorth-carolina-is-de-novo-central [https://perma.cc/S2VN-D66U] [hereinafter De Novo
Central].
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part III.
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ability to assist in de novo bank formation, as well as congressional action
to possibly compensate for these limitations. 15 Part V analyzes North
Carolina’s potential receptiveness to new bank entry amid changing
conditions throughout the state’s banking landscape. 16 Part VI describes
proactive measures the FDIC and new bank management can take toward
ensuring success in establishing and maintaining newly formed banks. 17
Part VII discusses the landscape for de novo banks going forward. 18
II. THE RECENT HISTORY OF DE NOVO BANKING AND POSSIBLE REASONS
FOR LOW DE NOVO FORMATION FOLLOWING THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS
From 2009 to 2013, only seven new bank charters were
established nationally, 19 a sharp decline from an average of more than
100 de novo bank formations per year from 2002 to 2008. 20 These
numbers should hardly come as a surprise, however, due to the cyclical
nature of de novo formation. 21 For instance, de novo activity surged
throughout the economic growth periods of the early 1960s, 1970s, and
1980s; it declined following the economic downturns of the late 1980s
and early 1990s, then once again recovered as economic conditions
improved in the mid-1990s. 22
If history continues to hold true, what goes down should come
back up. 23 In other words, history demonstrates that de novo activity
typically decreases during recessions and fares well during periods of
economic upswing. 24 However, some feel the current scarcity of de novo
banks is unparalleled throughout recent history, 25 and the numbers

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
See infra Part VII.
Adams & Gramlich, supra note 6, at 2.
ROISIN MCCORD ET AL., FED. RES. BANK OF RICHMOND, EXPLAINING THE DECLINE IN
NUMBER
OF
BANKS
SINCE
THE
GREAT
RECESSION
2
(2015),
THE
https://www.richmondfed.org/~/media/richmondfedorg/publications/research/economic_bri
ef/2015/pdf/eb_15-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2JX-5KSD].
21. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 2, at 3.
22. Id.
23. See id. (showing the cyclical nature of de novo bank formation).
24. Id.
25. A. GEORGE IGLER & ROBERT J. ANGERER, JR., IGLER PEARLMAN P.A., COMMUNITY
BANKING
IN
THE
21ST
CENTURY
1
(2018),
http://iglerlaw.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/02/Community-Banking-in-the-21st-Century.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C5NJ-K5EP].
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
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certainly support this assertion. 26 For example, following the nine-month
recession from July 1990 to March 1991, although new FDIC-insured
commercial bank charters declined considerably from just under 150 in
1990, the number of new charters never fell far below fifty in each year
from 1991 to 1994, before eventually shooting up again. 27 Contrast this
to slightly under 100 new FDIC-insured commercial bank charters in
2008, to only twenty-four in 2009, 28 and practically zero for many of the
years following. 29
As time progresses following the Financial Crisis, however, a
gradual uptick in de novo interest is currently on pace with recent
economic improvement. 30 For instance, in 2018 the FDIC received
twenty-four applications for federal deposit insurance—more than double
the number of applications filed in 2017. 31 Further, based on the twentyone applications filed by the end of 2019, the 2018 increase was more
than just an anomaly. 32 However, predicting whether this uptick in
deposit insurance applications will actually result in a full blown de novo
banking resurgence first requires understanding the post-2008 de novo
bank decline. 33 The two main theories proposed for the significant
reduction in de novo bank entry following the 2008 Financial Crisis
include: (i) new legislation resulting in increased regulatory burden on
banks; and (ii) a weak macro economy. 34

26. See Kimberly Amadeo, History of Recessions in the United States, BALANCE,
https://www.thebalance.com/the-history-of-recessions-in-the-united-states-3306011
[https://perma.cc/8WFT-22JA] (last updated Dec. 7, 2019) (illustrating the United States’
history of recessions); see also id. (graphing the number of de novo bank applications
submitted by year throughout the United States).
27. Amadeo, supra note 26; IGLER & ANGERER, supra note 25.
28. M. Szmigiera, Number of New FDIC-Insured Commercial Bank Charters, STATISTA
(Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/193052/change-in-number-of-new-fdicinsured-us-commercial-bank-charters/ [https://perma.cc/59ZK-GDAU].
29. IGLER & ANGERER, supra note 25.
30. Id.
31. Dan Ennis, De Novo Activity Fell in 2019, BANKING DIVE (Jan. 3, 2020),
https://www.bankingdive.com/news/de-novo-activity-fell-2019-fdic/569775/
[https://perma.cc/86W6-CHS2]; Rachel Witkowski, Floodgates Open? De Novo Applications
Surge
at
FDIC,
AM.
BANKER
(Oct.
3,
2018,
4:34
PM),
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/floodgates-open-de-novo-applications-surge-at-fdic
[https://perma.cc/T49Y-8CVY].
32. See Ennis, supra note 31 (explaining that twenty-one de novo applications were
submitted by the end of 2019).
33. Adams & Gramlich, supra note 6, at 2–3 (providing two theories for the post-2008
de novo bank decline).
34. Id.
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The Impact of Stricter Regulations Imposed on Banks Following
the 2008 Financial Crisis

Because de novo banks failed at approximately double the rate of
more established banks during the Financial Crisis, the FDIC was
criticized for its lenient deposit insurance approval standards leading up
to 2008. 35 In response, the FDIC reformed its regulatory scheme, making
it more difficult for new banks to gain FDIC insurance. 36 Such regulatory
changes included: higher capital ratio requirements; 37 increased attention
on Bank Secrecy Act anti-money laundering requirements; 38
implementation of enterprise risk management systems; 39 and greater
emphasis on competent corporate governance. 40
Apart from imposing stricter standards on those seeking deposit
insurance, regulations were enacted to affect the already existent banking
industry. 41 Such regulations included the Basel Committee’s increased
capital and liquidity requirements; increased regulatory compliance
demanded by the Dodd-Frank Financial Reform and Consumer
Protection Act; and additional rules instituted by the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau regarding mortgage lending. 42
Ultimately, the increased regulatory burden on de novo bank
entry and activity post-Financial Crisis, combined with the banking
industry’s uncertainty regarding the interpretation and future application
of these regulations, may have decreased the attractiveness of chartering
a new bank. 43
B.

The Impact of a Weak Macro Economy Following the 2008

35. James M. Kane et al., Phoenix Rising: De Novo Bank Formation?, VEDDER PRICE
(Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.vedderbanking.com/2018/03/update-de-novo-bank-formation2015-2018/ [https://perma.cc/XV7G-22JA].
36. Id.
37. Id.; Financial Institution Letter from the Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. to Newly Insured
FDIC-Supervised Depository Institutions (Aug. 28, 2019) (on file with author),
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2009/fil09050.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C3X6A6SK].
38. Kane et al., supra note 35.
39. Id.; Financial Institution Letter from the Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp, supra note 37.
40. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., CRISIS AND RESPONSE: AN FDIC HISTORY, 2008–2013 91
(2018),
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/crisis/crisis-complete.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TGU9-6MXD]; Kane et al., supra note 35.
41. Adams & Gramlich, supra note 6, at 3.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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Financial Crisis
The FDIC suggests that the de novo bank decline resulted
substantially from influences separate from the agency’s deposit
insurance application process. 44 Similarly, a Federal Reserve Board
(“FRB”) study on the weak, post-2008 macro economy’s effect on
decreased de novo activity proposes that interest rates and other nonregulatory factors likely caused at least 75% to 80% of the decline in new
charters from 2009 to 2013. 45 To explain this decline, the study identifies
two consequences of the post-2008 macro economy responsible for lower
banking profits: (i) a decrease in the federal funds rate; and (ii) a low
demand for banking services. 46
First, the 2008 recession led the Federal Reserve (“Fed”) to lower
its benchmark interest rate to a range of 0.0% to 0.25%, essentially zero,
until December 2015 when the Fed raised interest rates to a target range
of 0.25% to 0.5%. 47 This low interest rate environment was particularly
harmful for new banks, whose net interest margins are tied much closer
to the Federal Funds rate than are the net interest margins of established
banks. 48 This is because newly chartered banks have no foundation of
past loans on which they collect interest. 49 Instead, these entrant banks
primarily hold lower yielding government securities and federal funds,
and the loans these banks issue during their early days are issued at or
near current interest rates. 50 As a result, new bank profitability postFinancial Crisis was at the mercy of near zero interest rates. 51
44. Lalita Clozel, OCC Attacks on FDIC’s De Novo Process Are off Base, Experts Say,
AM. BANKER (Aug. 10, 2017, 1:49 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/occ-attackson-fdics-de-novo-process-are-off-base-experts-say [https://perma.cc/R2LA-M9YN] (“[T]he
FDIC and Fed have argued that the de novo drought has more to do with factors other than
the application process at the agencies, including the low level of interest rates.”).
45. See Adams & Gramlich, supra note 6, at 27 (describing the results of a study
conducted by Federal Reserve Board members Robert Adams and Jacob Gramlich).
46. Id. at 2–3.
47. See id. at 3 (stating that a low interest rate environment emerged from the weak
economy post-Financial Crisis);
Kimberly Amadeo, Fed Funds Rate History with Its Highs, Lows, and Charts, BALANCE,
https://www.thebalance.com/fed-funds-rate-history-highs-lows-3306135
[https://perma.cc/Z6R9-T5HQ] (last updated Jan. 29, 2020); Jeff Cox, Fed Raises Rates by
25 Basis Points, First Since 2006, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/16/fed-raisesrates-for-first-time-since-2006.html [https://perma.cc/4Y8S-YJD7] (last updated Dec. 17,
2015, 8:50 AM).
48. Adams & Gramlich, supra note 6, at 11.
49. Id. at 11–12.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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Second, the study reasons that decreased expansion by existing
banks into new geographic markets signified an overall lowered demand
among households and businesses for banking services, particularly loans
and deposit-taking services, following 2008. 52 Because both new bank
charters and expansion by established banks reached historically low
levels, it is unlikely that regulations affecting only de novo banks were
primarily responsible for the overall decline in bank entry. 53 In other
words, incumbent bank expansion should not have declined to
historically low levels solely due to the FDIC’s 2009 restrictions on de
novo banks. 54 So factors common to both established and de novo banks
must have led to the decline in expansion. 55
Further, looking specifically at the effect of increased compliance
costs on de novo bank formation, the Fed determined that incumbent
banks’ non-interest costs to asset ratios remained steady throughout the
decades leading up to its study, and that de novo banks’ ratios only
slightly increased following 2007. 56 However, it is important to note that
since this 2007 study, the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis has indicated
that smaller banks are hit harder by compliance costs than their larger
counterparts. 57 In fact, researchers found that as bank size decreases,
relative compliance costs go up. 58 For example, banks holding assets
under $100 million claimed that, on average, approximately 10% of their
noninterest expenses went toward covering compliance costs, while the
study’s largest banks allocated, on average, only 5% of their non-interest
expenses toward compliance costs. 59
III. FDIC ACTION TO SPARK A RESURGENCE IN DE NOVO BANK

Id. at 4–5, 27.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Sarah Chacko, Compliance Costs Drop but Small Banks Pay More Than Big Ones,
PRO
CENTRAL
BANKING
(Apr.
26,
2018,
5:38
PM),
WSJ
https://www.wsj.com/articles/compliance-costs-drop-but-small-banks-pay-more-than-bigones-1524778738 [https://perma.cc/LS8U-THGF].
58. Id.
59. Id.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
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APPLICATIONS
Ultimately, every de novo bank must procure FDIC deposit
insurance. 60 However, de novo banks have a choice on whether to apply
for a national or state charter. 61 A de novo bank pursuing a national
charter must apply to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(“OCC”), and upon approval, is supervised by the OCC and gains Federal
Reserve System membership. 62 A de novo bank pursuing a state charter
will apply to the applicable state’s regulatory officials, and upon
approval, is supervised by the state’s banking commission, along with
either the Federal Reserve for state member banks or the FDIC for state
nonmember banks. 63
Regardless of which charter is chosen, the FDIC, the Fed, and the
OCC are all campaigning for de novo bank formation. 64 For example,
the OCC demonstrated its support by suspending the application fees for
new bank charters in 2018. 65 It is clear, however, that the FDIC has
provided the most active support for new bank charters among the
regulatory agencies. 66 In fact, some believe that the FDIC has corrected
a faulty de novo process. 67 Whether or not the FDIC actually fixed the
de novo process is still up for debate. 68 However, the agency
60. KW Stevenson, How to Start a De Novo Bank?, BMA (Apr. 3, 2019),
https://www.bmabankingsystems.com/blog/2019/4/3/how-to-start-a-de-novo-bank
[https://perma.cc/7RTU-PWKW].
61. P’SHIP
FOR
PROGRESS, DE NOVO BANK APPLICATION PROCESS,
https://www.fedpartnership.gov/bank-life-cycle/start-a-bank/de-novo-bank-applicationprocess [https://perma.cc/S4AZ-L787] (last visited Jan. 6, 2020).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. E-mail from Todd H. Eveson, Attorney, Wyrick, Robbins, Yates, & Ponton, to author
(Oct. 16, 2019, 7:58 EST) (on file with author) (explaining that the Fed is pushing for de novo
bank formation along with the FDIC); see also IGLER & ANGERER, supra note 25, at 5 (stating
that the OCC has suspended application fees for new bank charters in 2018).
65. IGLER & ANGERER, supra note 25, at 5.
66. See Clozel, supra note 44 (“Some even argue that the FDIC is more interested in the
formation of traditional new community banks than the OCC . . . .”); see also Monica C.
Meinert, FDIC Launches Initiative to Encourage De Novo Formation, ABA BANKING J. (Dec.
6, 2018), https://bankingjournal.aba.com/2018/12/fdic-launches-initiative-to-encourage-denovo-formation/ [https://perma.cc/9QMF-8C5E] (outlining the FDIC’s efforts to help initiate
de novo bank formations).
67. Donald Musso serves as President and CEO of FinPro, a consultancy that helps
financial institutions apply for bank charters. Clozel, supra note 44 (quoting Donald Musso
saying “[t]he FDIC has fixed the de novo process”).
68. See id. (providing the Comptroller of the Currency’s accusations that the FDIC is
intentionally keeping de novo banks from successfully completing the deposit insurance
application).
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undoubtedly implemented substantial changes in an effort to resurrect de
novo activity, supporting one bank insider’s assertion that the FDIC is
desperately working to attract new bank entrants. 69
As failure for de novo banks more than doubled that of smaller
established community banks during the Financial Crisis, the FDIC’s
deposit insurance approval standards leading up to this period were
criticized as too lenient. 70 Such alarming statistics pushed the FDIC to
send out FIL-50-2009, 71 increasing the period for heightened review of
newly chartered banks from three years to seven years. 72 During this
seven-year period, new FDIC insured banks were required to hold greater
capital, and experienced increased FDIC examination. 73 However, the
FDIC repealed FIL-50-2009 on April 6, 2016, consequently reducing the
period of enhanced supervisory monitoring of newly insured depository
institutions from seven years to three years. 74 As a result, de novo banks
must now only hold a minimum of 8% Tier 1 Leverage Capital 75 for the
first three years of operation instead of seven. 76 At the very least, this
change is symbolically significant as it parallels the pre-recession
standard found in the FDIC Statement of Policy on Applications for
Deposit Insurance. 77
The FDIC also began taking measures in 2014 aimed toward
promoting greater transparency throughout the deposit insurance
69. Meinert, supra note 66; Hilary Burns, Will De Novo Activity Pick up in 2019? Don’t
Bet on It, AM. BANKER (Dec. 21, 2018, 1:33 PM) [hereinafter De Novo
Activity], https://www.americanbanker.com/news/will-de-novo-activity-pick-up-in-2019think-again [https://perma.cc/KZ2P-FAGU].
70. Kane et al., supra note 35.
71. The FDIC’s Financial Institution Letter titled “Enhanced Supervisory Procedures for
Newly Insured FDIC-Supervised Depository Institutions.” Financial Institution Letter from
the Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., supra note 37.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Kane et al., supra note 35; Clozel, supra note 44.
75. A bank’s Tier 1 capital ratio is its core capital (i.e., disclosed reserves and common
stock) divided by its risk-weighted assets (bank assets weighted by credit risk). Mitchell
Grant, Tier 1 Capital, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/tier1capital.asp
[https://perma.cc/9DZ4-5QEN] (last updated May 6, 2019).
76. IGLER & ANGERER, supra note 25, at 2.
77. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FDIC STATEMENT OF POLICY ON APPLICATIONS FOR
DEPOSIT
INSURANCE,
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/5000-3000.html
[https://perma.cc/3KEE-UTAN] (last updated Apr. 20, 2014) (“Normally, the initial capital
of a proposed depository institution should be sufficient to provide a Tier 1 capital to assets
leverage ratio . . . of not less than 8.0% throughout the first three years of operation.”); see
also IGLER & ANGERER, supra note 25, at 3 (explaining that prior to the 2008 Financial Crisis
the de novo period lasted for three years instead of seven); Kane et al., supra note 35, at 2.
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application process. 78 For example, the FDIC issued Deposit Insurance
“Questions and Answers” to help applicants better comprehend the steps
required to complete the federal deposit insurance application. 79 Further,
in 2017, the FDIC issued a handbook designed to guide applicants
through the federal deposit application process. 80 The FDIC also
established outreach meetings in several regions throughout the country
for those seeking a de novo charter. 81 These meetings identify helpful
resources for applicants and provide an overview of the FDIC’s
application review procedures. 82
Along with encouraging greater transparency throughout the
application process, the FDIC provided applicants ample opportunity to
improve the strength of their applications before officially submitting
them for review. 83 Specifically, new deposit insurance applicants may
now receive instructive feedback on a draft application from FDIC staff
members before filing their formal application. 84
Lastly, the FDIC requested feedback on other ways to enhance
the deposit insurance application process, demonstrating its dedication to
continuous improvement. 85 For example, the FDIC posed specific
questions to commenters asking what changes the FDIC could make to
the application process for traditional community banks. 86
The FDIC has not been alone in its efforts to combat the de novo
shortage. 87 The American Bankers Association (“ABA”) provided the
78. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 2, at 7 (describing the purpose and use of
the FDIC Deposit Insurance “Questions and Answers” (Q&As) issued in November 2014).
79. Id.; FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE RELATED TO THE FDIC
STATEMENT OF POLICY ON APPLICATIONS FOR DEPOSIT INSURANCE (2016),
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2016/fil16024.html
[https://perma.cc/W5YCZUSB].
80. Kane et al., supra note 35.
81. Daniel H. Burd & John J. Spidi, FDIC Holds De Novo Outreach Conference,
MARTINDALE
(NOV.
16,
2016),
https://www.martindale.com/banking-financialservices/article_Jones-Walker-LLP_2237152.htm [https://perma.cc/EF3J-D8TM].
82. Id.
83. Meinert, supra note 66.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON THE FDIC’S DEPOSIT
INSURANCE
APPLICATION
PROCESS
8,
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2018/pr18095a.pdf [https://perma.cc/CPP9-3T3X]
(last visited Jan. 26, 2020).
87. See Banker Task Force Shares Recommendations on Enhancing De Novo Process,
ABA BANKING J. (Aug. 3, 2018), https://bankingjournal.aba.com/2018/08/banker-task-forceshares-recommendations-on-enhancing-de-novo-process/ [https://perma.cc/CJ2W-RN4G]
(describing the role of the banker task force in encouraging de novo bank formation).

2020]

DE NOVO RESURGENCE

375

FDIC with a “banker task force,” a group of bank leaders with former de
novo experience aiming to alleviate difficulties facing de novo
formation. 88 The task force recently offered its proposed solutions to
Chairman Jelena McWilliams, and cited regulatory issues as a significant
issue in the de novo process. 89 Specifically, the “banker task force”
pointed to the overall length of the application process as a remaining
hindrance. 90 The FDIC’s guidelines for processing a new bank’s deposit
insurance application present a sixty-day and 120-day time frame for the
expedited and standard procedures, respectively. 91 However, because the
processing clock only begins when the application is deemed
“substantially complete,” it takes longer than sixty days to get an
application approved in practice. 92 FDIC guidelines mandate that the
case manager reviewing the federal deposit insurance application should
determine whether an application is “substantially complete” within
thirty days after receipt. 93 However, according to one bank expert, an
application is rarely determined to be “substantially complete”
immediately after filing. 94 Therefore, even if the case manager reviews
the application within thirty days after receipt, the application may not
qualify as “substantially complete” until after thirty days, ultimately
lengthening the application process. 95
IV. THE FDIC’S SHORTCOMINGS AND CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
SEEMINGLY ENHANCING THE PROBABILITY OF A SUCCESSFUL DE NOVO
RETURN
Notwithstanding these FDIC efforts, there are still substantial
obstacles for starting a new bank that fall outside of the FDIC’s control,
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id.
Id.
FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., GENERAL APPLICATION PROCESSING TIMEFRAMES FOR
REGIONAL OFFICES, https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/applications/application-processingtimeframes.pdf [https://perma.cc/DRF6-5S3C] (last visited Jan. 6, 2020).
92. DIV. OF RISK MGMT. SUPERVISION, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., DEPOSIT INSURANCE
APPLICATIONS:
PROCEDURES
MANUAL
11
(2019),
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/applications/depositinsurance/procmanual.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CS6M-Y2EQ].
93. Id.
94. E-mail from Todd H. Eveson, supra note 64.
95. DIV. OF RISK MGMT. SUPERVISION, supra note 92; see also E-mail from Todd H.
Eveson, supra note 64 (explaining that it generally takes longer than sixty days to gain
application approval in practice).
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starting with high capital requirements. 96 In fact, many within the
banking community believe the high capital requirements present the
most substantial hindrance to de novo formation. 97 However, the ABA’s
task force explained that believing these capital requirements can be
lowered, in itself, presents an obstacle in the de novo formation process. 98
Recently, successful applicants gathered anywhere from $20 million to
$40 million to meet their capital requirements. 99 One bank insider
illustrates the difficulty of satisfying such requirements, describing the
likelihood of finding $20 million to start a bank in a 5,000-person town,
for example, as very low. 100
Difficulty in hurdling high capital barriers is exacerbated by the
current interest rate climate. 101 An investor’s decision to fund, and
therefore, a bank’s ability to enter a market, is determined by expected
profits to be earned from entry. 102 From an investor’s perspective, the
lending business likely appears unappealing with interest rates currently
“squeezed,” resulting in a low net interest margin. 103 These potential
investors will likely find little solace in the current Federal Reserve
Board, whose members clearly hold differing opinions regarding what

96.
97.
98.
99.

Clozel, supra note 44.
Id.
Banker Task Force Shares Recommendations, supra note 87.
R. Alan Deer, De Novo Banks on the Rise, BRADLEY (November 20, 2018),
https://www.financialservicesperspectives.com/2018/11/de-novo-banks-on-the-rise/
[https://perma.cc/LJB5-MUVX]; see Paul Schaus, It’s Not Enough to Fix the De Novo
Application Process, AM. BANKER: BANKTHINK (Oct. 9, 2019, 9:00 AM),
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/its-not-enough-to-fix-de-novo-applicationprocess [https://perma.cc/Q2ZL-N9RX] (stating that although “[t]here’s no minimum capital
requirements that can serve as a guidepost,” many recent applicants consider raising “at least”
$15 to $20 million).
100. Clozel, supra note 44 (quoting David Baris, a partner at Buckley Sandler, who
illustrates the difficulties associated with meeting capital requirements in a smaller town).
101. See Adams & Gramlich, supra note 6, at 3 (explaining that de novo banks’ returns on
loans dwindle during low interest rate periods); see also Smart Things to Know About Sources
of
Income
for
a
Bank,
ECON.
TIMES,
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/wealth/save/smart-things-to-know-about-sources-ofincome-for-a-bank/articleshow/54377370.cms [https://perma.cc/X4GJ-RWJK] (last updated
Sept. 19, 2016, 6:30 AM) (describing interest earned on loans as the primary source of income
for commercial banks).
102. Steven A. Seelig & Tim Critchfield, Merger Activity as a Determinant of De Novo
Entry into Urban Banking Markets 9 (Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Working Paper No. 1, 2003).
103. Wayne Abernathy, Actual Change in De Novo Policy Proving Hard for FDIC, AM.
BANKER:
BANKTHINK
(Sept.
6,
2016,
8:30
AM),
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/actual-change-in-de-novo-policy-proving-hardfor-fdic [https://perma.cc/JM8S-MHMY].
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direction the federal funds rate should go. 104 As of late September 2019,
the Federal Reserve cut interest rates a quarter point, to a target range of
1.75% to 2%, before again lowering the bench mark interest rates to the
current range of 1.5% to 1.75%. 105 If further cuts are in store, net interest
margins—particularly for new banks—are certain to continue suffering
as a result. 106
Nevertheless, bank profitability should increase following the
recent corporate tax rate cuts. 107 Investors, then, may be more accepting
of risks associated with de novo banks if there is potential for higher aftertax returns on equity investments from capital gains. 108 Further, for
corporations investing in de novo banks, lower marginal rates result in
smaller personal tax payments, which frees up additional money for
investment. 109 Ultimately, it would appear that investors should be better
able and more incentivized to invest in a more profitable banking industry
following the corporate tax cut. 110 However, the corporate tax rate cuts
do not help banks profit any more than other companies benefiting from
the lower corporate tax rate. 111 Therefore, because in the short-term new
banks, particularly in a low interest rate environment, suffer from low net
interest margins, and in the long-run the net interest margin is at the
mercy of a federal funds rate controlled by an unpredictable Fed,
investors may be more inclined to invest in non-bank institutions. 112
104. Victoria
Guida,
Divided Fed Cuts Rates a Notch,
POLITICO,
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/09/18/federal-reserve-cuts-interest-rates-1501881
[https://perma.cc/3B4U-MMN3] (last updated Sept. 18, 2019, 4:41 PM).
105. Id.; Jeanna Smialek, Federal Reserve Cuts Interest Rates for Third Time in 2019,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
30,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/30/business/economy/federal-reserve-interest-rates.html
[https://perma.cc/U77B-MKS2].
106. See Adams & Gramlich, supra note 6, at 12 (“[N]ew banks have greater exposure to
current interest rates, while incumbent banks have diversified portfolios of loans and
securities with varying yields and interest rates (and have lower holdings of federal funds).”).
107. Burns, supra note 9 (describing the beneficial role of recent tax reform on the
likelihood of new bank formation and profitability).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. (quoting Tony Plath, a finance professor at the University of North Carolina at
Charlotte, stating “[t]ax reform helps create the sort of economic environment and investor
climate that favors the creation of more startup banks, especially in states that are healthy,
growing and business-friendly”).
111. See David Floyd, Explaining the Trump Tax Reform Plan, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/taxes/trumps-tax-reform-plan-explained/
[https://perma.cc/D9C4-MGL7] (last updated Jan. 20, 2020) (explaining that the Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act (TCJA) benefits both banks and “other” corporations).
112. Adams & Gramlich, supra note 6, at 12; see Guida, supra note 104 (characterizing
the Federal Reserve as “divided” regarding monetary policy).
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When considering the above, in combination with the detrimental
impact compliance costs can have on a smaller bank’s profitability, it
appears logical that investors may choose to forgo investing in a de novo
bank. 113 However, through the Economic Growth Act (“EGA”) enacted
in May of 2018, efforts are being made to lower these compliance
burdens. 114 In fact, North Carolina’s first community bank entrant in a
decade, American Bank & Trust, categorized the EGA in their offering
circular as “an attempt to provide regulatory relief to smaller . . . financial
institutions.” 115 Whether directly or indirectly, the EGA has the potential
to assist the de novo banking industry. 116
First, Title II of the EGA contains provisions directly assisting
community banks through deregulation. 117 For example, upon the EGA’s
enactment, community banks are not subject to the Volcker Rule, 118
including its bans on proprietary trading. 119 The EGA also contains
provisions aimed at simplifying capital rules for community banks, 120 and
Section 101 of the Act provides community banks greater freedom when
making decisions regarding its lending practices. 121 In addition to these
benefits, community banks holding under $5 billion in total consolidated
assets are subject to more lenient reporting requirements, and banks
113. See Floyd, supra note 111 (stating the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) benefits both
banks and “other” corporations); see also Chacko, supra note 57 (describing the
disproportionate effect of compliance costs on smaller banks).
114. See Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
115–174, § 203, 132 Stat. 1296 (2018) (providing “[c]ommunity bank relief” under § 203 of
the Act); see also Fields, supra note 9, at 373 (describing the Economic Growth Act’s
potential benefits for de nov o bank formation).
115. Caroline Hudson, Charlotte Region’s Startup Bank, CHARLOTTE BUS. J. (May 21,
2019, 2:33 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/charlotte/news/2019/05/21/charlotte-regionsstartup-bank-becomes-ncs-first.html [https://perma.cc/5PDF-9E4V]; AM. BANK & TR.,
OFFERING CIRCULAR (2018).
116. See Fields, supra note 9, at 373 (stating that increasing the SIFI threshold should push
BHCs with total assets slightly below $50 billion into acquiring de novo banks); see also
Richard M. Alexander et al., Passage of the Economic Growth Act, ARNOLD & PORTER (June
1, 2018), https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2018/06/passage-ofthe-economic-growth-act-modifies [https://perma.cc/7X7G-QFUT] (listing the EGA
provisions providing direct regulatory relief for community banks).
117. See Alexander et al., supra note 116 (describing the “community bank relief”
provided under § 203 of the EGA).
118. The Volcker Rule prohibits banks from participating in various types of speculative
investments.
James
Chen,
The
Volcker
Rule,
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/v/volcker-rule.asp [https://perma.cc/29L4-G4S8] (last
updated Dec. 9, 2019).
119. Alexander et al., supra note 116.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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holding under $3 billion in total consolidated assets may extend the
length of time in between regulatory examinations from twelve months
to eighteen months. 122
Second, looking to the EGA’s indirect effects, prior to the EGA’s
enactment, financial institutions with $50 billion or more in total assets
were automatically labeled systemically important financial institutions
(“SIFI”). 123 However, Section 165 of the EGA raised the $50 billion
threshold at which an institution is automatically labeled a SIFI to $250
billion. 124 It is no surprise that bank holding companies sought to avoid
this SIFI designation due to the additional regulatory costs associated
with it. 125 Therefore, bank holding companies were less willing to
undertake M&A activity that pushed them above the $50 billion mark. 126
Now that financial institutions can surpass this $50 billion threshold
without receiving the SIFI label, however, financial institutions with
slightly less than $50 billion in total assets are in a prime position for
M&A activity. 127
Theoretically, a friendlier M&A environment is great news for
the de novo banking landscape for two reasons. 128 First, due to
“personnel efficiencies and consolidations,” senior officers of acquired
banks normally sell their stock and lose their jobs. 129 Therefore, as
mergers increase, once these senior officers’ non-compete agreements
expire, they can use their banking experience and capital to form their
own de novo banks. 130 Second, investor optimism, and therefore,
incentive for formation, should increase as newly formed banks are more
122. Id.
123. See Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.

115–174, § 165, 132 Stat. 1296 (2018) (substituting the $50 billion threshold for SIFI
designation with $250 billion); see Fields, supra note 9, at 360 (explaining that Section 165
of the EGA raised the SIFI designation threshold from $50 billion to $250 billion).
124. Id.
125. See David C. Ingles & Sven G. Mickisch, Increase in SIFI Threshold Should Spur
More
Bank
M&A
Activity,
SKADDEN
(Apr.
25,
2018),
https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2018/04/quarterly-insights/increase-in-sifithreshold-should-spur-more-bank [https://perma.cc/B232-C8VN] (explaining that bank
holding companies labeled as SIFIs face “stricter oversight and more burdensome regulatory
requirements, including the Federal Reserve Board’s enhanced prudential standards”).
126. Id. (stating that the EGA’s provisions should lead bank holding companies
“benefiting from this legislation . . . to take a renewed interest in M&A . . . .”).
127. Fields, supra note 9, at 368.
128. See id. (explaining the benefits of a friendlier M&A environment for the de novo
banking landscape).
129. Id. at 373.
130. Id.
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likely to be acquired by bank holding companies, now able to increase
their total assets above $50 billion without fear of SIFI designation. 131
Despite these theoretical benefits, although still in its early days,
as of November 1, 2019, the EGA has not yet proven effective in
promoting bank sales for premiums. 132 In fact, a little over a year after
the EGA’s enactment, premiums have fallen. 133 Through November 1 of
both 2018 and 2019, premiums averaged 174% and 155% of a seller’s
tangible book value for that year, respectively. 134 Further, 2019 data
indicates that the EGA has not yet spurred M&A activity as some
predicted. 135 Excluding BB&T’s merger with SunTrust, the aggregate
value of bank M&A deals dropped 19% from November 2018 to
November 2019. 136 In fact, leading up to November 2019, under 10% of
sellers in these merger deals held over $1 billion in assets. 137 Considering
over 90% of merger deals have involved the sale of banks holding less
than $1 billion in assets, it is unlikely these acquiring banks moved to
make such minimal additions to their total assets because of the $200
billion dollar increase in the SIFI designation threshold. 138 In other
words, with such a relatively minimal increase in assets, it is likely the
acquiring bank could have made such an acquisition prior to the EGA’s
enactment and remained under the SIFI designation. 139
V. NORTH CAROLINA’S FUTURE DE NOVO BANKING LANDSCAPE
Ultimately, those looking to enter the banking industry may find
that buying an already existing bank presents a cheaper and easier route
than going through the de novo charter process. 140 In fact, North
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 368.
Davis, supra note 10.
Id.
Id.
See id. (comparing M&A activity throughout the banking industry in 2018 to that in

2019).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See id. (explaining that the majority of bank sellers involved in 2019 M&A deals held
a relatively low value of assets).
139. See id. (explaining that the majority of bank sellers involved in 2019 M&A deals held
a relatively low value of assets).
140. See Jeff Gerrish, Can America Grow New Banks Again?, BANKING EXCHANGE (Jan.
25, 2017, 4:53 PM), http://m.bankingexchange.com/blogs-3/community-bankingblog/item/6677-can-america-grow-new-banks-again [https://perma.cc/JPJ4-ZU52] (listing
the advantages of buying an established bank as opposed to applying for a de novo bank
charter); see also Ken McCarthy, Proposed North Carolina De Novo Withdraws Application,
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Carolina’s banking industry exemplifies the difficulties associated with
starting a de novo bank. 141 As of May 2019, the state has only witnessed
one de novo bank, American Bank & Trust, successfully established
within the past decade. 142 By contrast, the state’s banking industry
experienced several de novo applications withdrawn. 143
These
withdrawals are likely attributed to difficulties in raising adequate
capital. 144 Such difficulties are particularly onerous when multiple de
novo efforts are concentrated in one geographic area, as there are only so
many potential investors available. 145 Consequently, Spirit Community
Bank in Statesville, Dogwood State Bank in Raleigh, 146 and Community
Bank of the Carolinas in Winston-Salem, 147 all withdrew their charter
applications. Looking specifically at Dogwood State Bank, in May of
2019, Dogwood State withdrew its application with the North Carolina
Office of the Commissioner of Banks and the FDIC, electing to instead
recapitalize Sound Bank in Morehead City, NC. 148
Nevertheless, North Carolina’s Chief Deputy Commissioner of
Banks, Rowe Campbell, explained that the recent increase in bank
consolidation throughout North Carolina opened up the market for de
novo entry. 149 Despite North Carolina’s de novo difficulties, the numbers
certainly appear to support this assertion, as North Carolina lost half of
AM. BANKER (June 28, 2019, 2:12 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/proposednorth-carolina-de-novo-withdraws-application [https://perma.cc/6SBV-F2UF] (explaining
that those who backed Raleigh’s Dogwood State Bank eventually chose to buy an established
bank rather than submit a de novo charter application).
141. Hudson, supra note 115 (stating that North Carolina has seen only one de novo bank
successfully established in the past decade).
142. Id.
143. Hilary Burns, De Novo Activity’s up, but Organizers Face Familiar Obstacles, AM.
BANKER (Jan. 24, 2019, 1:51 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/de-novoactivitys-up-but-organizers-face-familiar-obstacles
[https://perma.cc/8JLP-SGH6]
[hereinafter Obstacles].
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Signs of Life in De-Novo Bank Activity, BAUER FIN. (June 10, 2019),
https://www.bauerfinancial.com/2019/06/10/signs-of-life-in-de-novo-bank-activity/
[https://perma.cc/YVL4-ZHUR].
147. McCarthy, supra note 140.
148. Joshua Recamara, Dogwood State Bank Withdraws Application, S&P GLOBAL (Nov.
30,
2018),
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/newsinsights/trending/O3L0MPm8ZkUjCR6JgzKDMA2Sanchez- [https://perma.cc/8JT9-3UJC];
Aaron Sánchez-Guerra, Sound Bank Becomes Dogwood State Bank, NEWS & OBSERVER (Oct.
7, 2019, 04:07 PM), https://www.newsobserver.com/news/business/article235820492.html.
149. See De Novo Central, supra note 12 (“We’ve had so much consolidation—there’s
definitely a market, a need and a desire [for community banking] in a lot of the
communities.”).
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its banks since 2010. 150 Within the past three years alone, the North
Carolina banking industry witnessed the sale of several regional banks to
larger, out-of-state competitors. 151 Among the regional banks lost
include: BNC Bancorp of High Point, Yadkin Financial Corp. of Raleigh,
Capital Bank Financial Corp. of Charlotte, and Great State Bank of
Wilkesboro. 152
One bank insider explained that North Carolina’s increased
merger activity and subsequent community banking void has left business
and community leaders longing for a return of local management
complementary to community banking. 153 This is welcome news for de
novo hopefuls, particularly when considered alongside the fact that many
of the community banks chartered in the period prior to the 2008
Financial Crisis came about in markets undergoing bank consolidation. 154
If one bank insider is correct in his assertion that witnessing success in
establishing a de novo charter will persuade others to try establishing
their own bank, then American Bank & Trust could be the first of many
new bank entrants. 155
Some view BB&T’s merger with SunTrust Bank, the largest
merger announced in over a decade, as a potential precursor to a
resurgence in North Carolina’s de novo banking activity, particularly on
the heels of recent FDIC regulatory changes. 156 Certainly this merger
will add to the already pervasive consolidation striking North Carolina’s
banking industry, 157 but the impact of this megamerger remains
unclear. 158 Bank customers who feel degraded to a nameless number are
150. De Novo Boom, supra note 9.
151. Richard Craver, Consolidation Spurs Renewed Interest in Startup Community Banks,

WINSTON-SALEM J. (Mar. 18, 2018), https://www.journalnow.com/business/consolidationspurs-renewed-interest-in-startup-community-banks/article_2b3ce350-bfc4-5d9d-a8da516564e1916f.html [https://perma.cc/S9MD-WJ55].
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See Yan Lee & Chiwon Yom, The Entry, Performance, and Risk Profile of De Novo
Banks 2 (Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. & Ctr. for Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 3, 2016),
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/cfr/2016/wp2016/2016-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/SC6JSMVX] (finding that many of the de novo charters established from 2000 to 2008 formed in
markets undergoing bank mergers or acquisitions).
155. See De Novo Boom, supra note 9 (pointing to the potential benefits of a successfully
established de novo bank for the rest of the de novo banking landscape).
156. De Novo Wave, supra note 11.
157. See Craver, supra note 151 (illustrating instances of recent bank consolidation within
North Carolina).
158. De Novo Wave, supra note 11 (describing the potential effects of the BB&T-SunTrust
merger on North Carolina’s de novo banking landscape).
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more likely to cease their relationship with that bank. 159 Therefore,
generally, it is the larger competitor bank buying the smaller community
bank that triggers local investors to reestablish the personal touch of a de
novo bank that is often lost in a larger bank. 160 However, the BB&TSunTrust merger presents different circumstances. 161 In terms of total
assets, BB&T and SunTrust are currently the thirteenth and fourteenth
largest banks in the United States, respectively, and each hold
approximately $165 million in total customer deposits. 162 Although the
BB&T-SunTrust merger will produce the sixth largest bank in the United
States, 163 customers of each bank are likely already familiar with this type
of large bank relationship. Therefore, it may be more likely that Truist
customers will find themselves used to the level of customer service
presented, allowing the merged bank to retain its former BB&T and
SunTrust customers. 164
Despite uncertainty regarding customer reaction to the BB&TSunTrust merger, as the largest merger announced in over a decade, 165
efficiency considerations will likely push senior officers of both BB&T
and SunTrust out of the newly formed Truist, and once these senior
159. The
Banking
Customer
Experience
Report,
QUALTRICS,
https://www.qualtrics.com/customer-experience/banking-report/
[https://perma.cc/XQ5957XX ] (last visited Jan. 28, 2020) (“[C]ustomers will leave within 14 months if they don’t
have a good experience, and 56% of customers looking to leave say their bank hasn’t made
an effort to keep them from switching.”); see also Shep Hyken, Businesses Lose $75 Billion
Due to Poor Customer Service, FORBES (May 17, 2018, 5:30 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/shephyken/2018/05/17/businesses-lose-75-billion-due-topoor-customer-service/#6ccba13c16f9 [https://perma.cc/4KGL-EHE9] (providing the results
from NewVoiceMedia’s 2018 report stating that 67% of customers will consider switching
“brands” due to unpleasant customer service).
160. Craver, supra note 151 (quoting Lee Burrows, chief executive of Banks Street
Partners of Atlanta, stating “[i]t is that time in the life cycle of community banks that many
of the community banks have merged with other larger organizations, leaving business and
community leaders desirous of a local bank with local decision makers”).
161. See Erin Oneil, The Biggest Banks in the United States, BALANCE,
https://www.thebalance.com/the-big-4-us-banks-315130
[https://perma.cc/3BKL-7BRY]
(last updated Nov. 20, 2019) (showing that Branch Banking & Trust Corp. and Sun Trust
Banks Inc. represent the thirteenth and fourteenth largest banks in the United States,
respectively).
162. Id.
163. Ben Lane, Truist Is Here, HOUSING WIRE (Dec. 9, 2019, 1:41 PM),
https://www.housingwire.com/articles/truist-is-here-bbt-suntrust-complete-merger/
[https://perma.cc/PM3W-ABX3].
164. Kyle Nazario, These Are the 5 Largest Banks in America, ATLANTA JOURNALCONSTITUTION (June 12, 2019), https://www.ajc.com/business/these-are-the-largest-banksamerica/Hk2QNM6nQdZTwNlLxvn8EM/ [https://perma.cc/DQ55-6NYZ] (stating that
Truist will be the sixth-largest bank in the United States); Gerrish, supra note 140.
165. De Novo Wave, supra note 11.
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officers’ non-compete agreements expire, they can use their banking
experience and capital to form their own de novo banks. 166 Such
expectations are reflected in one bank expert’s analysis that the logical
candidates to start de novo banks in North Carolina are the market
presidents or city executives from BB&T or SunTrust. 167 So ultimately,
it appears at least some industry participants feel this merger could serve
as a catalyst for a resurgence in North Carolina de novo banking
activity. 168
VI. ACTIONS THE FDIC AND NEW DE NOVO BANK MANAGEMENT
SHOULD TAKE TO ENSURE A NEWLY ESTABLISHED BANK’S SUCCESS
The FDIC has arguably been successful in promoting initial
investor interest in the prospect of acquiring a new bank charter. 169 Since
the FDIC demonstrated its newfound willingness to accept de novo bank
applications for FDIC insurance in 2016, 170 this upswing in interest has
shown in the numbers. 171 In fact, the FDIC received more applications
in 2016 than in the four prior years combined. 172 The FDIC must now
consider the proposals of the ABA banker task force to ensure de novo
success past just the application submission stage. 173 Specifically, the
FDIC must clarify expectations regarding how long application review
will take; consider reconfiguring the rate cap constraining de novo banks,
as the current rate cap 174 prevents their ability to attract deposits; make
clear that the FDIC’s de novo manual will determine capital
requirements; and establish a de novo team at the FDIC focused solely
on overseeing applications. 175
166. Fields, supra note 9, at 373; see also De Novo Wave, supra note 11 (explaining that
former BB&T or SunTrust officers represent probable candidates to establish de novo banks).
167. De Novo Wave, supra note 11.
168. Id.
169. See Clozel, supra note 44 (describing the “demonstrated uptick in interest for new
bank charters” amid FDIC promotional activity and regulatory changes).
170. Kane et al., supra note 35.
171. See Clozel, supra note 44 (stating that the FDIC received eight applications in 2016).
172. Id. (stating that the FDIC received eight applications in 2016).
173. See Banker Task Force Shares Recommendations on Enhancing De Novo Process,
supra note 87 (describing the banker task force’s recommendations to the FDIC for promoting
de novo bank expansion).
174. THE INDEP. CMTY. BANKERS OF AM., ICBA POLICY RESOLUTION,
https://www.icba.org/advocacy/policy-resolutions/brokered-deposits-and-the-fdic’snational-deposit-rate-caps [https://perma.cc/MU3T-6HVY] (last visited Feb. 7, 2020).
175. Banker Task Force Shares Recommendations on Enhancing De Novo Process, supra
note 87.
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The FDIC should also use its supervisory role to ensure the
stability of de novo banks once they are established. 176 To do this, the
FDIC must monitor risk-taking behavior and encourage proper risk
management procedures. 177 The FDIC could additionally consider
limiting de novo reliance on non-core sources of funds, an influential
factor in recent de novo failures, as well as limiting loan concentration. 178
Apart from setting limits, the FDIC should continue educating new
banking institutions on relevant issues, through analysis such as that
found in the FDIC’s issuing of “Managing Commercial Real Estate
Concentration.” 179
Along with FDIC action, de novo bank management should take
steps both during the business planning stage and once their new bank is
established to ensure a healthy existence. 180 As discussed above, many
bankers currently consider the high capital requirement the most
substantial hindrance in the de novo formation process. 181 However, a
2018 Igler and Pearlman review explains that reconfiguring a bank’s
growth plan may reduce this apprehension regarding capital
requirements. 182
This is because a conservative growth plan
encompassing realistic goals over an institution’s first three years
requires less capital than a more aggressive growth strategy, since the
amount of capital needed is a fraction of the bank’s asset size and
176. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 7 (explaining that the FDIC presides over
approximately four thousand banks and savings banks for “operational safety and
soundness”).
177. Lee & Yom, supra note 154, at 14 (describing the negative impact excessive risktaking had on de novo banks formed in advance of the 2008 Financial Crisis).
178. See id. (characterizing those de novo banks dependent upon non-core funding and
investing deeply in C&D lending prior to the 2008 Financial Crisis as “financially fragile”
compared to their “small established” counterparts).
179. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., MANAGING COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE
CONCENTRATIONS,
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/supervisory/insights/siwin07/article02_real_
estate.html [https://perma.cc/ZW42-82KW] (last updated Dec. 7, 2007) (providing banks
with valuable information regarding commercial real estate lending).
180. See Paul Nadler, De Novo Banks Need Top Talent, Not Just Cash Series: 6, AM.
BANKER
(Jan.
4,
1987),
https://search-proquestcom.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/docview/292867607?OpenUrlRefId=info:xri/sid:summon&accoun
tid=14244 [https://perma.cc/9KRJ-986H] (recommending the steps necessary for maintaining
a healthy de novo bank); see also IGLER & ANGERER, supra note 25, at 4 (explaining the
positive impact that forming a “realistic plan for growth” has on a de novo bank’s chances for
success).
181. Clozel, supra note 44 (“Bankers, meanwhile, said the biggest obstacle is neither
the de novo application process nor interest rates, but the high capital requirements for
institutions.”).
182. IGLER & ANGERER, supra note 25, at 4.
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composition. 183 Therefore, a business plan that projects the bank will
reach $300 million in assets within its first three years will necessitate
much greater capital than more realistic projections to reach $150 million
to $200 million in assets. 184
Finally, upon the de novo bank’s establishment, management
should make sure to: (i) hire better talent, even if it means paying higher
salaries; (ii) maintain a close-knit board passionate about their role both
within the bank and greater community; (iii) select a competent chief
executive officer familiar with the area; (iv) garner enough capital
initially to maintain the ability to make significant loans and withstand
the early years of little to no profit without having to raise additional
capital in order to comply with examiners’ requirements; and (v) lastly,
remember that success in receiving a charter does not necessarily equate
to success as a bank. 185
VII. CONCLUSION
Following the 2008 Financial Crisis, the rate of new bank entry
throughout the United States plummeted. 186 Whether this decline
resulted from increased regulatory oversight throughout the banking
industry, or from non-regulatory factors such as interest rates, 187 the
FDIC and Congress are working to reignite de novo formation. 188
However, if high capital requirements currently present the most
substantial hindrance in successful de novo entry, 189 the FDIC and
Congress, although able to spur interest in applying for new bank
charters, are fairly limited in their ability to assist in actual de novo
formation. 190 Therefore, those looking to enter the banking industry may
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id.
Id.
Nadler, supra note 180.
MCCORD ET AL., supra note 20.
Adams & Gramlich, supra note 6, at 2–3.
See Clozel, supra note 44 (stating that there has been a “demonstrated uptick in
interest for new bank charters” amid FDIC promotional activity and regulatory changes); see
also Fields, supra note 9, at 373 (describing the Economic Growth Act’s potential benefits
for de novo bank formation); see also Craver, supra note 151 (characterizing Congress’s
recent federal corporate tax rate cut as an “advantage” for banks).
189. Clozel, supra note 44.
190. See Banker Task Force Shares Recommendations on Enhancing De Novo Process,
supra note 87 (explaining that believing these capital requirements can be lowered in itself
presents an obstacle in the de novo formation process); see also Obstacles, supra note 143
(explaining that difficulties in raising capital are exacerbated when multiple de novo efforts
are concentrated in one geographic area); see also FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 7
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find that buying an already existing bank presents a cheaper and easier
route than going through the de novo charter process. 191 However, if a
de novo resurgence is to occur, its best chance of success likely lies in
states such as North Carolina, where bank consolidation has left a
substantial void in the community banking market. 192
TYLER G. TALTON *

(stating that the FDIC’s primary roles include insuring bank deposits, overseeing bank
compliance with various laws, and responding to certain bank failures); see also Floyd, supra
note 111 (stating that the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) benefited both banks and “other”
corporations).
191. See Gerrish, supra note 140 (listing the advantages of buying an established bank as
opposed to applying for a de novo charter); see also McCarthy, supra note 140 (explaining
that those who backed Raleigh’s Dogwood State Bank eventually chose to buy an established
bank rather than submit a charter application).
192. See Lee & Yom, supra note 154, at 1 (finding that many of the de novo charters
established from 2000 to 2008 formed in markets undergoing bank mergers or acquisitions);
see also Craver, supra note 151 (quoting Lee Burrows Jr., chief executive of Banks Street
Partners of Atlanta, as stating “[i]t is that time in the life cycle of community banks that many
of the community banks have merged with other larger organizations, leaving business and
community leaders desirous of a local bank with local decision makers”).
* I am extremely grateful for the comments and advice from Professor Lissa L. Broome, Todd
H. Eveson, and the entire North Carolina Banking Institute editors and staff, in particular
Morgan Schick, Blake Leger, and Devon Tucker. I would also like to thank my family and
friends, for your endless support and encouragement throughout my law school career.

